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Abstract 
This essay explores Jameson’s reading of Goethe’s Faust II in Allegory 
and Ideology, putting it into dialogue with enquiries into Goethian allegory 
by other Marxist critics, namely Georg Lukács, Cesare Cases and Franco 
Fortini. Allegories of monetisation and dispossession in Faust II are 
explored, along with the limits of Lukács’s partial devaluation of the 
allegorical. The essay focuses in particular on how Jameson’s reading of 
Faust II can be interpreted as an allegory of theory itself, and in particular 
of the dialectic, thereby returning us to Lukács’s own parallel reading of 
Faust and Hegel’s Phenomenology, albeit in a different key.  
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It is perhaps not controversial to argue that the mainstream of Marxist 
theory and literary criticism has harboured considerable reservations 
about the cognitive and political valences of allegory. To the extent that it 
goes beyond delineating the contemporary pre-eminence of allegorical 
modes and recodes historical materialism as itself allegorical in nature, 
Jameson’s Allegory and Ideology poses a complex challenge to 
established habits of dialectical criticism. In what follows, I want to explore 
this challenge through the prism of Jameson’s reading of allegory in 
Chapter 8: ‘Dramatic: Faust and the Messages of Historicism’. Though 
Jameson does not thematise it here, Goethe’s Faust – to be more precise, 
Faust II, which is also the principal object of Chapter 8 – provided the 
occasion for one of the most significant and symptomatic Marxist 
engagements with the question of allegory, namely Georg Lukács’s ‘Faust 
Studies’, written in Moscow in 1940. For Lukács, in Faust II, Goethe 
appears as the great artist of a transitional epoch, both striving to maintain 
a holistic and humanist aesthetic and giving form to a disintegrating world. 
By contrast with the great nineteenth-century realists so dear to Lukács, 
Goethe stands as ‘the last defender of the aesthetic laws of the “artistic 
period” who creates, with their help, a great terminal art’.1 The titanic effort 
creatively to conserve these aesthetic laws is particularly evident in what 
concerns allegory. It is in the context of Goethe’s crucial correspondence 
with Friedrich Schiller in the late 1790s that he develops one of the most 
incisive statements regarding the difference between symbol and 
allegory, one that will govern much of Lukács’s own thinking about Faust, 
and especially about the transition between Part I (1808) and Part II 
(1831). As we read in Goethe’s Maxims and Reflections, in an aphorism 
from 1825: 
  
My relationship with Schiller was based on the decisive bent of both 
of us towards one object; our shared activity rested on our differing 
ways of striving to achieve this object. On a slight disagreement 
between us which we once discussed and of which I am reminded 
by a passage in his letter, I made the following reflections. There is 
a great difference whether a poet is looking for the particular that 
goes with the general, or sees the general in the particular. The first 
gives rise to allegory where the particular only counts as an 
example, an illustration of the particular; but the latter in fact 
constitutes the nature of poetry, expressing something particular 
 
1 Lukács 1968, p. 245. 
without any thought of the general, and without indicating it. Now 
whoever has this living grasp of the particular is at the same time in 
possession of the general, without realizing it, or else only realizing 
it later on.2  
 
The conundrum which Lukács’s own reading of Faust II strives to confront 
is the coexistence of Goethe’s normative depreciation of the allegorical – 
as generic, abstract, deprived of that ‘living grasp of the particular’ without 
which a cognition of the general is sterile – and his copious use of allegory, 
as he shifts from the ‘little world’ of Faust I to the ‘great world’ of Faust II. 
Lukács deals with this problem of style at different levels, which we could 
term phenomenological, philological, and aesthetic. Phenomenologically 
– using this term in the Hegelian sense, to which we shall return below – 
Faust II’s penchant for allegory is linked to the passage from the ‘naïve 
historicism’ of Faust I to a ‘reflected historicism’.3 Given the social content 
of Faust II, namely the dissolution of feudal relations and chivalric 
subjectivities, and the fermentation of capitalism (paper money and land 
appropriation) in the ‘intermundia’ of feudalism, the phantasmagorical and 
allegorical form taken by the poetic representation is in keeping with the 
transitional character of its historical object, that imperial court ‘which 
 
2 Goethe 1998, pp. 33–4. This passage and the one below are discussed in Luperini 1991.  
3 Lukács 1968, p. 183. 
phosphorizes like a ghost because of its inner rottenness’.4 As Lukács 
notes, remarking on the profound differences between the representation 
of feudalism’s eclipse in Faust II and Goethe’s 1773 play Götz von 
Berlichingen: 
 
The totality of the present thus reveals determinates which did 
indeed exist in themselves at the time, but which subsequent history 
alone has made clear and lucid for us. This is why the historical 
foundation of the second part (acts I and IV) is a grotesque danse 
macabre in which – as in the ancient danses macabres – not mere 
individuals appear but social types; a danse macabre in which even 
people appear as phantoms[.]5  
 
Philologically, Lukács identifies the origins of the style of Faust II in the 
allegorical form of Goethe’s courtly spectacles, his Masquerades 
[Maskenzügen]; in the 1807 fragment Pandora, understood as a 
dramatisation of the opposition between contemplation and action; and in 
the influence of Pedro Calderón de la Barca and ‘Oriental’ poetry. What 
does Goethe develop in these earlier experiments and draw from these 
older sources? According to Lukács, ‘elements which are appropriate for 
 
4 Lukács 1968, p. 188. 
5 Lukács 1968, p. 184. 
the decorative and poetic expression of powerful intellectual abstractions 
and a comprehensive typification of men and human relations’.6 Here is 
of course the clue to the aesthetic and normative (and thus, incipiently 
political) dimension of Lukács’s perspective, the translation of the 
allegorical into the typical. To claim Goethe’s allegories in Faust II as 
‘poetically genuine’ and devoid of the sterility usually associated to this 
device, Lukács has to claim that the allegorical figures of the second part 
are not ‘coded’ but instead represent ‘a highly direct typification of 
characters who express in a clear and distinct manner the essentials of 
their representative role in the destiny of the species and whose generic 
character is immediately evident’.7 By way of exemplification, he 
advances the figures of Baucis and Philemon, the tragic victims of a 
‘devastating attack on the pre-capitalist idyll’, itself a moment in the non-
tragic ‘course of a great historical necessity’. And yet, much as Lukács 
wishes to depict a Goethe who bends the abstractness of allegory to the 
sensible wealth of symbol (and perhaps this is what the ‘type’ ultimately 
allows), he concludes his ‘Faust Studies’ with the recognition that as the 
terminal poet of an unfinished transition, Goethe could not evade the 
‘discrepancies [that] arise between the objective demands of expression, 
which have become necessary’, namely in the ‘allegorizing tendency’ of 
 
6 Lukács 1968, p. 249.  
7 Lukács 1968, p. 250. 
Faust II, and ‘the subjectively compelling mode of expression of the poet’ 
– in other words, his desire for symbolisation.8 Whence Lukács’s 
concluding critical observation regarding those sections of Faust II that 
remain ‘cold and hard, without human transitions; sections in which the 
allegorical element preponderates too much’.9 
 The great Marxist Germanist Cesare Cases, who served as a 
consultant on Franco Fortini’s remarkable Italian translation of Faust, 
distanced himself from Lukács’s ‘Studies’ – to which he otherwise 
acknowledged a great debt – precisely on this point. For Cases, Lukács 
hesitates between a recognition of the historical-phenomenological 
necessity of the allegorical and a normative-aesthetic repudiation of it, in 
keeping with Goethe’s own strictures. Both assume the separation of 
essence and appearance, the universal and the particular, which is our 
fate under capitalism, but then try to pass off allegory as something else 
(for instance, the type). For Cases instead, ‘Goethe is forced to use 
allegory to express the reality of capitalism, which empties appearance of 
any specific essence and reduces it to pure phantasm of a single essence, 
which is money’.10 And, to counter Lukács’s devaluation of the allegorical, 
he reminds us both of the use that the Marx of the Manuscripts makes of 
 
8 Lukács 1968, p. 252. 
9 Lukács 1968, p. 253. 
10 ‘Gli Studi sul Faust di György Lukács’ (1985), in Cases 2019, p. 152. On the link between allegory 
and conceptual abstraction in Goethe, and Lukács’s struggles in his Aesthetics and other texts to 
provide a new form of Goethian Erlebnis (lived experience) adequate to capitalist conditions, especially 
via his theory of the type, see the acute reflections in Luperini 1991.  
Mephistopheles’ paean to money’s protean power (as Lukács himself had 
done)11 and of the ‘masquerade’ that accompanies monetisation in Act I 
of Faust II. It is, Cases writes, ‘in this phantasmagoria that is celebrated 
the triumph of money, the elimination of every natural element and its 
substitution with artificial products: not for nothing does the parade open 
with the beautiful Florentine flower sellers peddling artificial flowers’.12 
Following Heinz Schlaffer’s work on Faust II and the ‘allegory of the 
nineteenth century’, also cited by Jameson, Cases can challenge the idea 
that Goethe’s work is relayed and surpassed by the more adequate 
representation of capitalism in Balzacian realism. To the contrary, for 
Cases it is the allegories of Faust II, more than the realist novel, which 
can give due primacy to the processes of commodification and reification, 
recognising that allegorical ‘abstraction is the only adequate way to 
express the abstraction of money’.13 It is no accident, then, that it is only 
in the twentieth century, and especially after the implosion of Lukács’s 
Third-International socialist horizon, that one can recover the adequacy of 
allegorical writing to capitalist real abstraction and comprehend Goethe’s 
work in that vein. 
 
11 Marx 1992, pp. 376–7. 
12 Cases 2019, p. 152. ‘And we think it meritorious, / even highly laudatory, / that our artificial flowers / 
bloom resplendent all year long’ (v. 5096–9). To underscore the place of the commodity, Cases also 
quotes verses 5114–5 of Faust II, ‘What is sold and those who sell it / well are worth your crowding 
closer’. Goethe 2014, pp. 132–3. 
13 Cases 2019, p. 154. Cases also engages with Schaffler and the German debate on Faust, including 
in Marxist circles, in Cases 2019, pp. 107–33. He also explicitly deals with Lukács’s confrontation with 
Benjamin’s treatment of baroque allegory in Cases 1985, p. 103. 
 This intention – Lukács taken beyond Lukács by subtracting the 
socialist-humanist telos of his aesthetic judgments – is also at work in the 
reading of Faust II in Allegory and Ideology, which provides a tour, at once 
dizzying and nuanced, through allegory’s variations in Goethe’s text. 
Money, that catalyst of allegorical abstraction, is of course foregrounded 
by Jameson, who notes that the passage from the ‘little world’ of the first 
part to the ‘great world’ of the second is marked, among other things, by 
Mephistopheles’ invention of money as an inflationary instrument 
designed to placate the Emperor’s subjects. In this, Faust II anticipates 
the way in which monetary circulation poses ‘a crucial representational 
problem for all modern narrative literature, in which money is too 
impersonal and collective an institution to be dealt with in its fundamental 
structure’,14 while it also signals ‘the advent of a radically new historical 
temporality’ – as Jameson notes with reference to Wagner.15  
We could thus argue that the representational problem is doubled 
and displaced by a problem of periodisation, having to do with the nexus 
of money and capitalism; in Lukács’s estimation, the diabolical invention 
of money in Act I stands more as a destructive force vis-à-vis the 
reproduction of feudal relations than as a form of capitalist value per se. 
Money’s ‘magical enlargement of the radius of human action’, ironically 
 
14 Jameson 2019, pp. 288–9. 
15 ‘Wagner as Dramatist and Allegorist’, Jameson 2015, p. 49. On money and allegory, see also Fletcher 
2012, pp. 397–8.  
noted by the young Marx in the 1844 Paris Manuscripts, does not 
eliminate the historical fact that ‘without a revolution of the relations of 
production, without a development of the productive forces, the 
petrifaction and decomposition of these conditions is accelerated by the 
infiltration of money’.16 Now, while Lukács describes Mephistopheles’ 
(and not Faust’s…) role in Acts IV and V, taken up with the drama of 
‘polderisation’ and expropriation, as concentrating in one ‘symbolic poetic 
figure’ the so-called ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital, and the 
introduction of productivity as the dominant principle of social life and 
action, we may wonder whether Jameson’s focus on property rather than 
industrial productivity isn’t more adequate to the transitional imaginary of 
Faust II – namely when he notes the theme of ‘land tenure and of the 
commodification of the soil, of individual versus collective ownership, in 
the final drama of eminent domain and the wresting of land from sea’.17 
We can see how Mephistopheles is here a kind of operator of transition(s), 
giving partial lie to an identification of Faust’s famous streben (striving) 
with any heroism of bourgeois subjectivity18 – though he can also function, 
 
16 Lukács 1968, pp. 198–9. 
17 Jameson 2019, p. 289. As Jameson also notes about that final act, over which so many interpretive 
disputes have been staged: ‘Whatever the transcendental conclusion the drama owes itself to stage, 
the raw exploitation and land grab of the final act, the blind man’s delight at the commotion of the lemurs 
waiting for his death, which he joyously takes like a slumlord to be the sound of the erection of new 
buildings and the creation of new value – all this grimly marks the close approach of the centenarian 
[Faust] to the unvarnished realities of his own postrevolutionary era’ (Jameson 2019, p. 297). 
18 On the problem of subjectivity in Goethe, see Löwenthal 1989. Goethe’s critique of false subjectivity, and of 
its aesthetic correlate, dilettantism, could also be linked to the problems of crisis and transition. As he remarked 
to Eckermann in 1826: ‘all epochs in a state of regression and dissolution are subjective, in contrast all 
progressive epochs have an objective diretion . . . our present time is a regressive one since it is a subjective 
as Jameson notes with regard to the class allegory of Gretchen’s tragedy 
in Faust I,19 as a bearer for feudal nostalgia, offering Faust ‘not so much 
personal and physical youth as the historical youthfulness of an older 
social system, with its transparent power structure and its hitherto 
unimaginable security, its unambiguous roles and satisfactions’.20 
 Lukács, as we have seen, had already tied the vicissitudes of style 
in Faust to the ‘great transitional epoch’ Goethe was writing in, an epoch 
whose very historicity ‘strain[s] the sensible unity of the forms and 
characters and, in increasing measure, tend[s] to burst it’.21 The theme of 
transition in Jameson’s reading is just as emphatic, but its overtones differ. 
As he puts it programmatically, ‘we will read Goethe as the poet of a 
contradictory absolutism, as the subject of a uniquely transitional historical 
moment which, like the sun striking the statue of Memnon, releases him 
into an incomparable literary engagement with all the then imaginable 
genres’.22 Accordingly, allegory here does not to simply define a stylistic 
 
one’. As Löwenthal observes: ‘I alluded to inwardness as an always present focus of disease of the German 
situation. I feel strengthened in my analysis when I find nearly the same expressions in Goethe. In a conversation 
with Eckermann on January 29, 1826 he said of an acquaintance: “he suffers from a common illness of today, 
from subjectivity." And he adds: "I would like to cure him of it." Critical consciousness has searched for two 
hundred years for a way of curing this illness, but it has not been found’ (p. 95). 
19 This matter is also dealt with in one of Lukács’s ‘Faust Studies’, ‘The Tragedy of Gretchen’ (Lukács 
1968, pp. 217–34). The nexus of class and allegory is at the centre of one of Jameson’s key texts of 
film criticism – Jameson 1977. 
20 Jameson 1977, p. 290.  
21 Lukács 1968, p. 157. 
22 Jameson 2019, p. 291. Parenthetically, we can note that a different coding of Goethe as a poet of 
transition will entail a divergent evaluation of the sense in which Faust is ‘a tragedy’ (as its subtitle tells 
us). Transition understood in terms of the stylistic and historical multiplicity foregrounded by Jameson 
ultimately cannot be reconciled with a reading of Faust, such as Lukács’s, which sees it as threading 
tragic episodes into a non-tragic whole (with the latter being characterised as historical necessity). See 
Lukács 1968, pp. 180–1 and passim. If Goethe is anti-tragic, for Jameson it is not so much in a Hegelian, 
option impelled by the tendential abstraction of a capitalist society, 
bringing about the quietus of the ‘artistic period’; it comes to constitute, in 
spite of Goethe’s own aesthetic preference for the symbol, the cognitive 
form and orientation of his final masterpiece. Drawing on the 
symptomatically spatial figure used by Goethe in a letter to Schiller to 
describe his ‘incommensurable’ opus (‘an enormous family of sponges’), 
Jameson underscores the ‘allegorical interplay’ of ‘distinct historical 
styles’ that ‘gives the text its unique meaning, in a transition or historical 
interregnum unparalleled elsewhere’.23  
It is here not otiose to corroborate Jameson’s insight with the 
testimony of Faust’s Italian translator Franco Fortini, a great Marxist 
literary critic (and poet) in his own right, who also introduced the Italian 
translation of Jameson’s Marxism and Form. In the preface to his 
translation, Fortini reflected on the technical and stylistic problems posed 
to any translator by the way in which Faust operated as a ‘poem dressed 
in literature, or rather in ten different literatures – from rococo to neogothic, 
Alexandrine to Elizabethan – which announces 70 or 80 years in advance 
of the first avantgardes the destruction of secular literary institutions and, 
to a certain degree, of poetry itself’.24 For Fortini too, allegory was the key 
 
as in a Nietzschean vein, in terms of ‘the discovery of the life-giving powers of strong forgetting as a 
way of consigning guilt … in that endless resurrection and renewal of primal innocence’ (ibid.). 
23 Jameson 2019, p. 289. 
24 Fortini, ‘Prefazione’, in Goethe 2012, p. lix. 
both to the formidable task of the translator (transcoding the ‘family of 
sponges’ across the historical palimpsest of an alien verse) and to Faust 
II’s contemporaneity, but especially to how Goethe’s transition might 
resonate with and inflect our own – following ‘a more general movement 
in postmodernity from the symbol to the allegory’.25 Explicitly marking his 
debt to and distance from Lukács’s ‘Studies’, Fortini noted the way in 
which Faust II could appear  
 
with the characters typical of dissolution, of parody, of irony, of 
abnormity; but this ‘catastrophe’ could appear as the paradoxical 
assemblage of a tradition and, at the same time, as itself a tradition. 
The stylistic syncretism and the eclecticism of the figurative and 
verbal material of Faust II … allow us to experience the whole work 
as the anticipation and prophecy of a profound condition of our age: 
the co-presence and cohabitation of different degrees of authenticity 
and life, of the crystallised and the fluid, of the semi-living and the 
semi-feral, of ‘idols’ and organisms. ‘We are allegories’, we read [in 
Faust II], and many today are aware of the obscure allegorical 
character – which is to say, the larval character, in the sense of 
 
25 ‘Eurotrash or Regieoper?’, Jameson 2015, p. 179.  
mask, role and allusion – of our humanity, as groups and 
individuals.26 
  
Something like a transition out-of-joint transpires from this passage, 
a sense that Goethe’s partially reluctant plunge into allegory speaks to a 
time – which is to say to an experience of historicity – which is not 
endowed with the directionality and momentum that Lukács could still 
assume. Or, following Jameson’s reading, we could say that transition is 
rethought, and in part spatialised, as ‘a superposition of several time 
periods that comment on one another’27 – where paradoxically such 
allegorical spatialisation could be regarded as a condition for a true 
‘reflected historicism’, to appropriate Lukács’s own formulation.28 The 
allegorist becomes the ‘master of ceremonies’ who allows the full 
maturation of a historicist perspective on styles that are thereby 
transmuted into ‘historical symptoms’, where the failure of the symbolic 
union of Greece and Germany (in its classical-Mediaeval key as the 
betrothal of Faust with Helen; in its modern one as the heroic demise of 
their child Euphorion – a stand-in for Lord Byron dying for Greek national 
liberation at Missolonghi) is itself a dialectical lesson. Strikingly, Jameson 
 
26 Goethe 2012, p. lxxiv. 
27 Jameson 2019, p. 292. 
28 This resonates with the claim that ‘[i]f Allegory had a middle name, it would be Antinomy. It lives, 
according to an old phrase, in “divided and distinguished worlds”.’ Fletcher 2012, p. 382.  
invites us to see in Faust not a twisted striving towards realism but, in a 
bravura passage on Faust II as a ‘reading play’, which calls to mind other 
visionary moments in his writing,29 a veritable upheaval of the very 
coordinates of literary visuality: 
 
The normal transpositions of description are here subverted by the 
pretext of some hallucinatory immediacy; and even the written 
emergences and disappearances – for it is always in a strange 
space of unheard of visual spectacles that figures suddenly arise 
against their blank background and just as unexpectedly vanish – 
come laterally across the field of vision of the inner and imaginary 
eye like hallucinatory images which have their own momentum: the 
eye does not turn in their direction to observe them, as is the case 
with more mimetic written description, but submits their passage 
from outside the immobilized gaze and across it into another 
nothingness. This inner eye posited by the reading play does not 
look (let alone read). It is passed through, and the reading of such 
 
29 I’m thinking not just of the well-known probings of the schizophrenic synaesthesias that accompany 
the postmodern, but, for instance, of that wonderfully disorienting panorama from Valences of the 
Dialectic were Jameson tells us how ‘within this horizon of immanence we wander as alien as tribal 
people, or as visitors from outer space, admiring its unimaginably complex and fragile filigree and 
recoiling from its bottomless potholes, lounging against a rainwall of exotic and artificial plants or else 
agonizing among poisonous colors and lethal stems we were not taught to avoid’. Jameson 2009, p. 
608.  
works at its most intense approximates a drugged state, a 
pharmacological trance.30  
 
Could we not advance the somewhat scandalous hypothesis that 
this catachresis of the allegorical text is also, after a fashion, a 
phenomenology of theoretical writing itself? After all, as Allegory and 
Ideology makes plain (including in the Faust chapter), Jameson’s 
preoccupation with the allegorical remains anchored in a political and 
aesthetic desire for cognitive mapping, and we should perhaps take this 
hallucinatory moment of allegory as interlinked with allegory’s oblique 
totalising powers. In a sense, Jameson could be seen here to bend the 
stick away from Lukács’s domestication of allegory into type, while also 
trying to do justice to the aesthetic or even sensory dimensions of the 
allegorical.  
Through Goethe, we can thus see allegory both as a cognitive 
mastery of styles conquered in the throes of transition (‘reflected 
historicism’) and as a potentially hallucinatory aesthetic. This is perhaps 
testament to Jameson’s own practice of theoretical writing, where 
moments of ‘trance’ can be reconciled with that strategic and combinatory 
 
30 Jameson 2019, p. 298. Jameson’s comments can be usefully complemented by Ladislao Mittner’s 
emphasis on the splitting of Faust II into monologues, on the one hand, and (allegorical, illusionistic, 
demiurgic) spectacles, or ‘revues’, on the other. Faust himself ‘periodically disappears, only to reappear, 
often in disguise, but he reappears not so much to act, as to make or let others act, and, above all, to 
witness a spectacle created by him or by others’. Mittner 2002, p. 982. 
mastery of styles and interpretive codes which may take the name of 
metacommentary, or indeed of Marxism – which is not a final world-view 
sublating without remainder other theories but a theoretical practice that 
has a multiplicity of theories as its material. We could hazard, then, that 
as a thinking in and of interregnum, in and from intermundia, Marxist 
theory is also allegorical,31 in the sense that Jameson argues that in 
allegory ‘the multiple and incommensurable codes of the traditions must 
nonetheless be used in order to convey the unrepresentable by way of 
our inevitable failure to represent’; while these codes are ‘all […] as 
ideologically and metaphysically tainted as they are indispensable’.32 
 Thus, a recognition, following Jameson, that ‘[a]llegory allows all 
such codes and yet reworks them by way of their juxtaposition and the 
acknowledgment of their multiplicity’,33 also brings the allegorist closer to 
the dialectician. This permits us, by way of conclusion, to recover an 
aspect of Lukács’s reading that might be felt to chime with Jameson’s 
project in Allegory and Ideology, namely the parallel reading of Faust and 
 
31 On the question of Marxism’s relation to the allegorical, which provided the initial occasion, in a critical 
dialogue with Althusserianism, for Jameson’s systematic use of that four-level theory of allegory that is 
the organon for Allegory and Ideology, see the crucial chapter ‘On Interpretation: Literature as a Socially 
Symbolic Act’ in Jameson 1983, pp. 1–88. Jameson had already sought to interpret Benjamin’s and 
Bloch’s thought in terms of the Mediaeval allegorical model in Jameson 1971, pp. 60–1; pp. 116–17. 
32 Jameson 2019, p. 307. This link between allegory and the unrepresentable contrasts with Goethe’s 
theory (rather than practice) of allegory, as a kind of integral (and thus impoverished, abstract) 
expression. As a posthumously published note lays out: ‘Allegory transforms an object of perception 
into a concept, the concept into an image, but in such a way that the concept continues to remain 
circumscribed and completely available and expressible within the image. Symbolism transforms an 
object of perception into an idea, the idea into an image, and does it in such a way that the idea always 
remains infinitely operative and unattainable so that even if it is put into words in all languages, it still 
remains inexpressible’. Goethe 1998, p. 141; and the commentary in Luperini 1991, pp. 91–5. 
33 Jameson 2019, p. 307. 
Hegel’s Phenomenology. While militating against ‘point-by-point’ 
allegories, or allegories of personification,34 dialectical thought refracted 
in a Goethian mirror does appear as a kind of allegoresis, one which, in 
its juxtaposition of multiplicity, undoes the dialectic’s customary 
association with chronological and teleological linearity. While ultimately 
wanting to uncover the developmental master code, or ‘strict ordering 
principle’ (historical necessity, the destiny of the species) beneath its 
individual or figural ‘abbreviations’, Lukács has to recognise the 
allegoresis (in Jameson’s sense) at work in the ‘roundelay of “forms of 
consciousness” in the Phenomenology of Mind, where the Parisian Terror 
comes after Diderot’s Rameau only to be followed by Antigone’,35 thereby 
affirming the presence in both Faust and the Phenomenology of ‘a 
fantastic-discontinuous, subjective-objective time and time-sequence’.36 It 
is thus only in a hallucinatory spatialisation of historical (and stylistic) 
referents that the logic of historical time can transpire through the 
empirical reality of chronological time, and the dialectic come to be 
(re)born out of the spirit of allegory. Perhaps it is only through such a 
rethinking of time that allegory and communism will no longer make such 
‘strange bedfellows’.37 
 
34 Jameson 2010, pp. 124–5. 
35 Lukács 1968, p. 178. 
36 Lukács 1968, p. 179. 
37 Jameson 1971, p. 116 (with reference to Bloch): ‘Allegory and Communism make strange 
bedfellows’. Commenting on the centrality of Faust to the Principle of Hope, Jameson will propose that 
Bloch’s Marxism may be more Goethian than Hegelian in kind (p. 140), and that ‘a kind of allegorical 
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